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By Dr. Munir Majid
Senior Visiting Fellow 
LSE IDEAS Southeast Asia International Affairs Programme
ASEAN In Perspective
BACKGROUND
The regional grouping ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations1) is often 
not sufficiently recognised for its accomplishments. When ASEAN was formed 
in Bangkok in 1967 by the five founding states, Indonesian confrontation 
against Malaysia of 1962-66 had only just ended, the Philippines still had 
an outstanding claim for the Malaysian state of Sabah, and Malaysia and 
Singapore had just gone through an acrimonious separation in 1965. The 
fact these countries could meet, move on and cooperate is reflective of great 
statesmanship. If it is remembered, further, that apart from these then-recent 
problems, there was also a sticking point in the discussions over the existence 
of foreign bases in the region, which almost led to a walkout from the talks 
in Bangkok by the Singapore delegation2,  it will be better appreciated how 
in its very establishment ASEAN signalled a major regional achievement.  
The ASEAN Declaration of 8 August 1967 was brief, citing growth, social progress 
and cultural development, regional peace and stability, and collaboration on matters 
of common concern as the purposes for ASEAN’s establishment.  Yet it was entered 
in the last paragraph of the Preamble: “Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary 
and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are 
not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence 
and freedom on states in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national 
development.” Security then was the primary concern, even if cooperation over it 
quite deliberately not specifically mentioned. 
At this time the Vietnam War was raging, with the TET Offensive to come in 1968 
and peace talks to take place afterwards between 1968 and1973 before the fall of 
Saigon in 1975. ASEAN was seeking to insulate itself from what was happening in 
Indo-China, although there was involvement of individual states in the failed American 
war effort that underpinned the desire to distance ASEAN from any appearance of 
group involvement in what was taking place. 
1 Presently comprising Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam
2 As related to the writer on 27 February 2009 by S.R. Nathan, President of the Republic of Singapore, then a member of 
the Singapore delegation
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On 27 November 1971, ASEAN issued the ZOPFAN 
Declaration in Kuala Lumpur “to secure the recognition 
of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, 
Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner 
of interference by outside powers.” ASEAN was now 
seeking the neutralisation of Southeast Asia. Again, 
regional security was the paramount concern.
That concern was not to be assuaged, as peace did 
not come to all of Southeast Asia with the end of 
the Vietnam War. There was a struggle for power 
and control in Indo-China, with Vietnam and outside 
powers, notably China, involved. The main theatre 
was Cambodia, where the internal struggle for 
power established the bloody rule of the Khmer 
Rouge and engaged Pol Pot, with the support of the 
Chinese, in a proxy battle for control with Vietnam. 
The antagonism between the Khmer Rouge regime 
and Vietnam led to the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia on Christmas day 1978, which ended 
the prospect of non-communist ASEAN engaging 
in peaceful cooperation with the unified Vietnam. 
ASEAN countries swiftly condemned the Vietnamese 
action, since non-violation of territorial integrity was 
a central principle of the regional grouping, as did 
China, which invaded Vietnam in 1979 in an abortive 
attempt “to teach it a lesson.” It was to be ten years 
after the fall of Phnom Penh in January 1979 that 
Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia.
According to Thanat Khoman, one of the founding 
fathers of ASEAN, because of the Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia, economic matters were “almost 
entirely neglected and set aside.”3 Indeed from 
1967 to the 1990s ASEAN’s main role was to ensure 
that, even if there was not peace and stability 
throughout Southeast Asia, the non-communist part 
was not destabilised and deflected from national 
growth and economic development.
  
3 Thanat Khoman, “ASEAN Conception and Evolution,” 1 September 
1992, www.aseansec.org/thanat.htm)
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ECONOMIC COOPERATION
From the end of the Pacific War through to the 
setting up of ASEAN and into the 1990s, the five 
founding members of the regional grouping plus 
Brunei, which had joined from 1984, experienced 
creditable economic development. Their respective 
growth was based first on commodities and primary 
resources, and import substitution strategies, which 
then progressed to export-led expansion. By the 
1990s Singapore had joined the ranks of the Asian 
economic tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Taiwan) and the other ASEAN member countries 
had become fast-growing emerging economies. 
With China and India also breaking economic growth 
records as they opened up their economies to the 
rewards of the free market, some proclaimed that 
the Asian Century was at hand. 
Even though Indo-China was going through turmoil 
of one kind or another during this time and Myanmar 
was to get into a dark age of military dictatorship 
following the coup led by General Ne Win in 1962, 
the line of security was held, the more so as ASEAN 
gained confidence in its diplomatic ability as a regional 
grouping to establish, effectively, a cordon sanitaire 
between the ASEAN and the non-ASEAN regions 
of Southeast Asia. While security concerns over the 
situation in Indo-China may have caused ASEAN to 
neglect matters of regional economic cooperation, 
there is no refuting the level of peace and stability 
achieved within the grouping, stability which was the 
basis of the economic development attained. With 
peace and stability largely in place across the whole 
of the Southeast Asia by the 1990s, ASEAN grew to 
incorporate those Indo-Chinese countries that had 
been in turmoil for so long. At the same time, ASEAN 
paid greater attention to pursuing its other purposes 
(although the concern with Myanmar’s human rights 
record continues to be a thorn in the flesh within and 
without the region). The Asian financial crisis of 1997-
98, which hit a number of ASEAN countries badly 
and even resulted in regime change in Indonesia, was 
also to concentrate minds on the need to protect 
their economies, both individually and cooperatively.
Under the ASEAN Charter, adopted at the regional 
grouping’s summit in Singapore on its 40th anniversary 
in December 2007, all three pillars of regional 
cooperation have been explicitly identified – the 
political-security, the socio-cultural and the economic. 
The push towards greater economic integration has 
been accelerated, with the aim of realising ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. The AEC has 
four objectives: a single market and production base; 
a highly competitive region; a region of equitable 
economic development; and a region fully integrated 
into the world economy. The process of economic 
integration has assumed greater urgency after slow 
initial progress due to the increased competitive 
challenge from China and India following the opening 
up of their economies in the 1990s, a challenge that by 
the year 2000 saw 87 per cent of FDIs – foreign direct 
investments – into Asia going to China. As mentioned, 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and now the 
global economic crisis have made ASEAN’s need to 
establish a meaningful geo-economic space between 
China and India even more urgent. The question 
is whether ASEAN, in this next cooperative phase, 
will be as successful in achieving economic benefit 
as it was in attaining regional peace and stability in 
its first generation of existence. What might be the 
impediments and what could be the solutions? Could 
ASEAN play an effective role in economic diplomacy 
as it did previously in political diplomacy?
It was in this context that a LSE IDEAS South East Asia 
International Affairs Programme (SEAP) workshop on 
“The Path to ASEAN Economic Integration” was held 
in Kuala Lumpur on 28-29 April 2009.  
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Chart 1: The Path towards ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)
Source: Overview of ASEAN Economic Community by Manasvi 
Srisodapol, Deputy Director-General of the Department of ASEAN 
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, LSE IDEAS workshop, 
Kuala Lumpur, 28-29 April 2009.
There is, evidently, a clear, charted path towards greater ASEAN economic integration. The questions raised 
at the workshop were with regard to its speed, quality, institutional and leadership support. Since the ASEAN 
Charter came into force in December 2008 there has been greater confidence, at least at the official level, in 
the process’s progress towards its objectives. Those less confident in the process, however, point to a patchy 
past record, continued institutional deficiencies, divergent views and interests, and the greater challenges 
of the times which may leave ASEAN lagging behind in the emerging global economic balance of power. 
The notion of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), one of the earliest of the ideas of economic cooperation 
that was introduced in 1992, has successfully bought tariffs down but it has not led to as much intra-
ASEAN trade as had been hoped. The average tariff rates for the ASEAN-6 have indeed come down from 
12.76 per cent in 1993 to 0.79 per cent in 2008, but for ASEAN as a whole they are at 1.95 per cent and, 
if Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) are taken apart, they are at 3.69 per cent. It is expected 
that zero tariff rate will be achieved among the ASEAN-6 by 2010 and, including the CLMV, by 2015. There 
are, however, exceptions with strategic products including rice and sugar exempted. Under the AEC, apart 
from the elimination of tariffs, the non-tariff barriers (NTBs) will also be addressed. There is, for example, to 
be increased transparency with on-line database for public access, a kind of shaming process. Members can 
also reach agreed timelines for the elimination of the NTBs separately, as has happened between Malaysia 
and Thailand. There has also been movement on trade in services, with packages covering 12 service 
sub-sectors. On movement of skilled labour, agreement has been reached for seven professional services 
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(engineering, nursing, architectural, surveying, 
accounting, medical and dental). There are also 
clearly time-lined commitments for comprehensive 
investment liberalisation and protection, with 
benefits also extended to foreign-owned ASEAN- 
based investors.
Both senior ASEAN government officials at the 
workshop bemoaned the fact that intra-ASEAN 
trade remained low at 25 per cent. In comparison, 
intra-European Union (EU) trade stood at 60 per 
cent. Only when trade among the ASEAN+3 states 
(China, Japan and South Korea) is taken into account 
does the figure reach a more satisfactory 50 per cent. 
This is a point of strategic significance as it poses the 
question of whether ASEAN alone can constitute a 
meaningful trading bloc. Wider regional integration, 
even as ASEAN plays catch-up with its own economic 
integration process, has not been sufficiently thought 
and worked through by the regional grouping. It is 
not an issue that can wait upon two summits a year, 
either for ASEAN or the wider East Asian region, a 
matter to which we shall return.
Abdul Rahman Mamat, the top official at the 
Malaysian Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
was particularly scathing of the many shortfalls in the 
ASEAN economic integration effort. Apart from the 
relatively limited intra-ASEAN trade, he pointed out 
that intra-ASEAN investment was also small. There 
are work plans to encourage such investment, but 
the numbers are still puny. In 2007 ASEAN investment 
into ASEAN was only 15 per cent of total inflow of 
FDIs into the region. The SMEs (small and medium 
enterprises) in the individual countries have also hardly 
been brought into the regional supply chain, as they 
still feed into their national economies. He concluded 
that the priority areas should be the following: SMEs 
should be given the push to invest across ASEAN 
borders and become pivotal to intra-ASEAN trade; 
targets should be set to increase intra-ASEAN trade; 
the harmonisation of standards and conformance 
should be accelerated; the services sector should be 
the main driver of the AEC. He was quite clear in his 
mind as to the impediments to implementing these 
policies – national interests and conflicting objectives 
– but this is not a peculiar or exceptional problem 
in any cooperative effort among any grouping of 
sovereign states (although more newly-independent 
states, as in Southeast Asia, which have many more 
recent experiences of real and threatened domination 
from near and afar, may be less inclined to let the 
national guard down). 
The point is, having acceded to the regional grouping it 
has to be presupposed there is intention to cooperate. 
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia of 1976, which ASEAN has succeeded in making 
the umbrella convention for regional cooperation 
within and without; the strictly members-only ASEAN 
Charter which came into force in December 2008; 
not to mention the various ASEAN summits and 
commitments (for example, the Bali Concord II in 
October 2003 when all member sates agreed to 
pursue closer economic integration by 2020, fast-
tracked to 2015 by the Charter); together these 
constitute overwhelming evidence of this cooperative 
will. The problem arises in actualised situations when 
commitments are watered and interpreted down, and 
exclusions are sought. This has been the main problem 
with ASEAN, particularly in respect of economic 
integration. Different members are at different stages 
of political and economic development and have to 
be accommodated;4  and ambitious targets give rise 
to expectations only available from an organisation 
which is institutionally-driven and rules-based. 
There seems to have been a realisation of the latter 
point with the promulgation of the ASEAN Charter, 
on which much hope is placed,5  but the former 
remains an outstanding issue in the overall ASEAN 
integration process.
4 See Analysis by Dr Narjoko: An Indonesian concern on equitable 
economic development, even though the AEC identifies narrowing the 
development gap through inter-ASEAN investment and SME development 
as one of its objectives, was expressed at the workshop by Dionisius Narjoko 
of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, Jakarta in his 
paper, An Indonesian perspective on ASEAN economic integration.
5 See Keynote Address by Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General of ASEAN, 
LSE IDEAS Workshop, Kuala Lumpur, 28-29 April
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At the workshop, the senior government officials also bemoaned the lack of the feeling of 
“ASEAN-ness” in the grouping, most of the integrative process being the work of officials 
with incessant and interminable meetings which may or may not arrive at conclusions 
often overridden at higher ministerial level. There was a lack of private sector participation, 
it was alleged, which was true. There was insufficient people-involvement, which it was 
claimed will be addressed now that the ASEAN Charter was in place. To take the first 
point, it should be noted businessmen prefer to take advantage of opportunities rather 
than to attend meetings, particularly if their outcome is uncertain of implementation. They 
appreciate the scale ASEAN offers (population: over 580 million, over 60 per cent under 
60 years old; GDP:$1.3 trillion; total trade:$1.4 trillion; rich natural resources, large talent 
pool), but see and experience the many obstacles and challenges, such as the border rules, 
the barriers, the differing standards and fragmented markets, the diverse cultures and 
languages, and the greater attractiveness of China and India. Therefore, they will move 
their business expansion and activities along the key success factors, such as market size, 
growth, pricing and flexibility, availability of talent, technology, specialisations and capital; 
and not be driven necessarily by any ASEAN regional imperative. This does not mean, 
as was evident from the presentation at the workshop by Azman Mokhtar, Managing 
Director of Khazanah Malaysia Berhad (Malaysia’s national investment arm), that there 
are no ASEAN cross-border investments and activities; indeed there are successful ones in 
telecommunication, aviation, real estate, plantations, with other sectors like healthcare, 
energy, leisure and tourism, and regional hubs based on specialisation (Mekong Basin, 
Greater Jakarta, Singapore-Iskandar, in Malaysia) offering great potential. However, as 
Azman Mokhtar noted, rather wryly, there are good big moves in ASEAN to integrate 
economically, but “it will take time”, meaning business will respond as opportunities are 
available but is unprepared to hang on the big plans for the big bang. Businessmen will 
not get involved in planning within a broad framework of no immediate benefit to them 
although, no doubt, when they have identified an immediate great opportunity they will 
lobby their governments. They are, in other words, not conceptual but practical. Perhaps 
the ASEAN integration process should also support specific major business initiatives not 
necessarily involving all member states. There was a clear message from the workshop that, 
instead of the other way around, business should be more effectively supported in the 
ASEAN integration process, with specific strengthening of the ASEAN secretariat to do so.
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A highly significant presentation was made at the workshop on a detailed effort at ASEAN 
capital market integration by Ranjit Ajit Singh, Managing Director of Malaysia’s Securities 
Commission. There is a cogent case for the integration of the ASEAN financial market, 
of which the capital market project is one area of activity. There is also the factor of scale 
of the pooled market capitalisation of the regional grouping’s major stock exchanges 
which would catapult it to 12th in the world, ahead of India and Korea in Asia. This 
work is well advanced and involves detailed and complex issues. It has progressed in the 
most professional manner since it began in 2004 after the Bali Concord II of 2003 which 
sought the roadmap on monetary and financial integration of ASEAN. The AEC 2015 
Blueprint seeks to achieve significant progress in building a regionally integrated market 
where capital can move freely, issuers are free to raise capital anywhere and investors 
can invest everywhere. The work, as well as its outcome, has a significance in the ASEAN 
economic integration effort in excess of its capital market implication, as it would signal 
the ability to address hugely complex issues of great national importance to achieve a 
greater regional good within the governance framework now formed by the ASEAN 
Charter. After focusing on three dimensions of integration (regulatory alignment and 
harmonisation, integrated market infrastructure to facilitate connectivity, and regional 
financial products base), the process has now reached the implementation plan stage, and 
the plan was endorsed by the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting on 9th April 2009. The 
ASEAN working committees are to review and incorporate appropriate recommendations 
of the plan, and the ASEAN Secretariat will monitor the integration process through a 
consolidated action plan and provide technical assistance.
There are still a number of fundamental issues to be thrashed out which could lead to 
impediments and delays in implementation of the plan. It is an acid test for ASEAN in this 
much vaunted age of the Charter. Will the ASEAN Secretariat have the determination, 
capacity and expertise to push through that consolidated action plan? Will there be the 
political will to implement a plan based on professional and highly technical preparation 
following an endorsed process? There are significant differences in the levels of development 
of the capital markets, with some jurisdictions also taking the view that integration should 
be with the rest of the world rather than just within ASEAN. Furthermore, capital controls 
and exchange restrictions exist in a number of member countries, as well as differences 
in withholding tax regimes. The different exchanges use different systems and trading 
platforms, and there will be resistance to using a common gateway for the intra-ASEAN 
network. If this capital market integration process makes meaningful progress, it would 
be a most encouraging development; if it does not, there will be a conclusion that there 
is really no change in the ASEAN process, even under the new regime of its Charter.
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BECOMING MORE EFFECTIVE 
As noted, much hope is invested in the ASEAN Charter, which formally came into force on 15 December 2008, 
to make the regional grouping more effective. Its purpose is to provide a legal and institutional framework 
for an ASEAN community, with the objectives of making the regional grouping more consequential, more 
rules-based and more people-oriented. It has been acclaimed by ASEAN leaders as introducing a regime 
that will make a difference in the process of integration and of setting up political-security, socio-cultural 
and economic communities. Decision-making and implementation are to become more flexible, with a 
relaxation of the principle of non-interference and giving an enhanced role to the ASEAN Chair. New organs 
were set up – the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community Councils and the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives. The summit is to be held twice a year.
Chart 2: New ASEAN Organisational Structure
Source: Manasvi Srisodapol
Dispute settlement mechanisms are in place for all three pillars of the community, and the role of the 
secretary-General of ASEAN has been enhanced in monitoring compliance. In case of serious breach of 
undertakings, the leaders will decide on the measures to be undertaken. The regional grouping is also to 
become more people-oriented by opening up a channel for consultation between ASEAN organs and civil 
society organisations. The terms of reference of the ASEAN human rights body is to be completed within 
one year of the Charter coming into force.
The Charter is undoubtedly a positive step that ASEAN has taken to make itself more effective and relevant. 
But it is still too early to see whether it will make ASEAN more successful in achieving its objectives fully and 
in a timely manner. Many new targets have been set, even if past ones have not been wholly achieved. At 
the same time greater challenges are being faced, particularly with respect to the global economy. 
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The early signs, unfortunately, have not been too encouraging. Even as Thailand has 
worked hard as the ASEAN Chair in the first year of the Charter coming into force, the 
postponement of the summit meetings in Pattaya in April because of Bangkok’s internal 
political troubles was more than an embarrassment. Singapore Foreign Minister George 
Yeo described it as a “great humiliation for the grouping” in a speech to the US-ASEAN 
Business Council in Washington on 28th April. The more general point must be that regional 
and extra-regional engagement cannot rely entirely on summits without mechanisms for 
off-summit consultation and provisions for alternative arrangements short of the formality 
of a summit. Lack of flexibility, and the appearance of being stymied at a time of financial 
and economic crisis, are not a good advertisement of a functioning regional association. 
At the same time, the jury is still out about the meaningfulness of setting up a human 
rights body when ASEAN is reticent about criticizing Myanmar for human rights abuses.6 
What ASEAN cannot avoid, Charter or no Charter, is strong leadership of the kind that 
distinguished it at the time of its establishment. This is absent today. With ten leaders 
across a wide spectrum of governance systems who do not know one another especially 
well, there has been a loss of the esprit de corps found among leaders of the original 
ASEAN-5 – even if they were robust in their disagreements – which made it more alive 
and consensus-seeking. Although times change, camaraderie and leadership are always 
needed. At the workshop, there was a discussion centred on the kind of factors of 
leadership and institutional support that have made the EU achieve many of its objectives, 
even if it was conceded the regional context of ASEAN was not that of the EU, and the 
EU itself has had its own failures and continues to face many challenges.7
GLOBAL CRISIS AND CHALLENGE
The ASEAN Chair was invited to attend the G-20 Summit in London on 2 April, 2009. 
This is a major breakthrough, especially at a time of crisis and challenge. What must also 
be done however is to establish a systemic link from ASEAN to a larger process of critical 
global importance. ASEAN must weigh in to be active in the establishment of the new 
world order.
The global financial and economic crisis has raised major issues of international macro-
economic and financial management. ASEAN must have detailed and well-articulated 
positions on these issues which must be presented orally and in writing. From observation, 
there is a penchant for generalities, with the leaders often uttering platitudinous motherhood 
points against protectionism, for economic stimulus, for better regulation and for reform 
of international financial institutions. It is not clear how many technical position papers 
were prepared on the ASEAN side, and how these became engaged with those of the 
others represented on the G-20, including after the summit meeting and going into the 
next one. For example, there was no clear and detailed ASEAN position at the London 
6 In a rare rebuke, the Prime Minister of Thailand as the ASEAN Chair issued a statement on 19 May 2009 expressing “grave 
concern” over the arrest and trial that had begun the previous day of Aung San Suu Kyi who, in her sixth year of detention due to 
end on 27 May, is accused of breaking the terms of her house arrest after an uninvited American swam to the house where she 
was being held. ASEAN repeated previous calls for her immediate release, and for her to be given adequate medical care and to be 
treated with dignity. The issuing of the statement followed a meeting of ASEAN senior officials, including from Myanmar, in Phuket, 
Thailand, signaling perhaps an active ASEAN on human rights issues under the regime of the Charter. The military junta in Myanmar 
responded on 25 May by lashing out at ASEAN and Thailand.
7 See Analysis by Colin Budd: The EU experience of the process of economic integration: successes, failures and challenges, LSE 
IDEAS workshop, Kuala Lumpur, 28-29 April 2009
10
Summit on the Chinese proposal for an enhanced role 
for SDRs (Special Drawing Rights) in the international 
financial and payments system. Being there is not 
enough. ASEAN has to be sufficiently organised 
to engage counterparts both diplomatically and 
technically. This can only happen when there is strong 
and competent support, which can only come from 
an empowered and technically resourced secretariat, 
and when the ASEAN Chair is given sufficient space 
to articulate the grouping’s position and engage with 
counterparts. Once the broad policy decision has 
been made, ASEAN governments must not continue 
to want to dot the “i’s” and cross the “t’s”. A more 
evidently effective ASEAN puts greater belief among 
its members in the association. It will have positive 
knock-on effects on other ASEAN efforts, including 
those at closer economic integration. This is the 
simple thesis of functional integration.
At the workshop in Kuala Lumpur, Professor Kang 
Shaobang of the Central Party School in Beijing, 
made two essential points.8 First, that ASEAN is 
the only successful regional organisation in all of 
Asia and should be the platform for greater Asian 
integration. And second, that ASEAN, along with 
other Asian countries, should address the problem 
of the US dollar as a reserve currency and come up 
with an Asian currency unit for settlement in their 
international trade. Both these proposals take us back 
to the need for ASEAN to be technically competent 
and fleet-footed, and to dock into firm extra-
ASEAN arrangements to make its views effectively 
heard on the major global economic and financial 
challenges of the day. ASEAN, rightly, prides itself 
on having been able to draw so many parties into 
its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976, after 
the amendment made in 1987 to allow accession 
by those outside the region (with the US being the 
latest party considering accession, as announced by 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Jakarta in February 
this year, which contests the point made by Douglas 
Paal at the workshop that ASEAN has not gained 
8 See Analysis by Professor Shaobang Kang, ASEAN in Asia Economic 
Integration, LSE IDEAS workshop, Kuala Lumpur, 28-29 April 2009. The 
Central Party School was instrumental for the conceptual policy plank of 
“peaceful rise” and then “peaceful development” (Discussion with Kang in 
Beijing, 5 December 2008)
traction in Washington). ASEAN has also been able 
to engage in dialogue, not to mention concluding 
FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) in numerous cases, 
with many extra-regional states, and has become 
the focal point for those relationships. The time 
has come, not least because of the global financial 
and economic crisis, for ASEAN to hard-wire the 
more important of these relationships to 
address the more important of the global 
challenges. Inevitably, there will be those within 
the grouping who will express the fear of 
dilution; that would be argument enough that 
ASEAN’s own effort at integration should get 
stronger support if individual members are not to 
hang separately.
The Chinese have been coming out more evidently 
to engage those in Asia undermined by the global 
financial and economic crisis, paying particular 
attention to threatened dollar reserves. There have 
been major proposals on expanding the role of SDRs, 
for example by Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the 
People’s Bank of China, and interesting suggestions 
on conversion of US Treasury dollar debt to US 
industrial equity.9 Meanwhile, China has also been 
actively supporting the now committed $120 billion 
Chiang Mai swap scheme set up by ASEAN+3 after 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, making the running 
with a contribution of $38.4 billion, swiftly matched 
by Japan, with $19.2 billion from South Korea. On 18 
April, 2009 Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced 
that China planned to establish a $10 billion fund 
to promote infrastructure that connects it to ASEAN 
nations. All these initiatives reflect and presage more 
active Chinese economic diplomacy which requires 
structured and detailed response from ASEAN which 
must not be found slow and wanting. On the other 
hand, the largest economy in ASEAN, Indonesia, has 
found new confidence with its direct membership 
of the G-20, with the expectation of achieving good 
GDP growth while others are struggling, under a 
democratic and stable government. Goldman Sachs 
9 See article by Professor Yu Qiao, Tsinghua University, Beijing in 
the Financial Times, 1 April, 2009. Also Zhou Xiaochuan, Reform of the 
International Monetary Syatem, www.pbc.gov.cn/english
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has recently reported that Indonesia will be among 
the ten largest economies in the world by 2050. 
Although not directly from the government, Indonesia 
has been asking questions of whether ASEAN can 
measure up in the new and dynamic developments in 
the global political economy.10  Indonesia, sometimes 
identified as a laggard in ASEAN economic integration 
efforts, has some clear views on how the regional 
grouping should progress – across all three fronts of 
the pillars of the community.11 
All these developments and moves by significant 
actors on the international stage at a time of turmoil 
and change call for a positive response from ASEAN, 
both in terms of engagement and organisational 
linkage, as well as by investment of intellectual 
capital in the ideas to form the management of the 
global political economy. In his closing speech at the 
workshop, Kishore Mahbubani expressed his full 
confidence that ASEAN would find the sweet spot 
in the new, what I would term, Asia-centric world. 
But that does not come without trying to get that 
best possible place.
From the papers that were presented, speeches and 
interventions that were made, and the extensive 
discussions that took place at the workshop, it was 
clear there are different perspectives on the rate 
of progress, challenges and prospects. The greater 
weight of opinion was on the side of disappointment 
and pessimism, although there was a strong view 
among the more influential that the pessimism was 
overdone and that there was sufficient political will 
and an overwhelming shift in the strategic economic 
balance towards the Asia-Pacific from which the 
ASEAN economic entity may benefit.
10 See Jusuf Wanandi, Remodelling regional architecture, PacNet 
Newsletter, February 19, 2009
11 Interview with Hassan Wirayuda, Foreign Minister of the Republic of 
Indonesia, 26 March 2008, Jakarta
12
